Foresight Guidelines on Molecular
Nanotechnology
Source: Foresight
Institute
Original Version 1.0: February 21, 1999
© Foresight Institute and IMM. Do not publish draft without
permission.
Contents
Preamble
Preamble
The term "Molecular Nanotechnology" (MNT) refers to the ability to
program matter with molecular precision, and scale it to three-dimensional
products of arbitrary size. This developing technology presents an unprecedented
new set of technical and economic opportunities. The opportunities include: the
development of inexpensive and abundant diamondoid building materials with a
strength-to-weight ratio 50 times greater than titanium, the possibility of
widespread material abundance for all the Earth's people, the development of
revolutionary new techniques in medicine, and the opening of the space frontier
for development. Along with these new capabilities come new risks, and new
responsibilities. The acceptance of these responsibilities is not optional. The
future capabilities of MNT also raise an unprecedented set of military, security
and environmental issues. Dealing with these issues proactively will be critical
to the positive development of the field.
The Foresight Guidelines were developed during and after a
workshop on Molecular Nanotechnology (MNT) Research Policy Guidelines sponsored
by the Foresight Institute and the Institute for Molecular Manufacturing (IMM).
The workshop was conducted over the February 19-21, 1999, weekend in Monterey,
California. Participants included: James Bennett, Greg Burch, K. Eric Drexler,
Neil Jacobstein, Tanya Jones, Ralph Merkle, Mark Miller, Ed Niehaus, Pat Parker,
Christine Peterson, Glenn Reynolds, and Philippe Van Nedervelde. The resulting
Foresight Guidelines ("the Guidelines") include assumptions, principles, and
some specific recommendations intended to provide a basis for responsible
development of molecular nanotechnology.
Continued research and education are needed to create a shared
understanding and sufficient knowledge base on the entire set of MNT development
and risk management issues that must be addressed. While discussion of
guidelines can begin today, the scientific and technical community will continue
to evolve its understanding of the issues. The Guidelines have already changed
over time to reflect that dynamic understanding and input by a wider community
(see Background section).
Future discussions of this subject should include detailed
consideration of the economic and environmental benefits of MNT, as well as the
potential problems. In particular, the need for some controls should not prevent
the responsible development of the technology. Rather than have reflexive, or
poorly informed controls imposed upon the MNT R&D process, the developing
MNT R&D community and industry should adopt appropriate self-imposed
controls, formulated in light of current knowledge and the evolving state of the
art. The possibility of the necessity for additional controls remains an open
question, and its resolution may depend to some extent on the success of
voluntary controls.
The NIH Guidelines on Recombinant DNA technology are an example of
self-regulation taken by the biotechnology community almost 25 years ago. While
the kind of artificial molecular machines of primary interest for nanotechnology
are expected to be very different from the kind of biological systems covered by
the NIH Guidelines (just as a 747 is very different from a sparrow, even though
both fly), the NIH Guidelines illustrate that advance preparations are possible
and can be effective. Those guidelines were so well accepted that the privately
funded research community has continued to submit research protocols for juried
review, in spite of the fact that it was optional for them to do so. In
addition, although the NIH Guidelines have been progressively relaxed since they
were first released, they did achieve their intended effect.
Experimenters and industry should have the maximum safe
opportunities to develop and commercialize the molecular manufacturing industry.
In addition, MNT should be developed in ways that make it possible to distribute
the benefits of the technology to the four fifths of humanity currently
desperate to achieve material wealth at any environmental or security cost.
Providing technical abundance alone cannot make a people wealthy and secure.
This also requires education, and social arrangements described as a high-trust,
civil society. However, technological abundance can alleviate many of the
conflicts that stem primarily from rivalry over resources. Reducing this
specific cause of conflict via molecular manufacturing could make the world more
secure than it is today. In addition, the release from bare economic subsistence
could enable billions of people to take advantage of the emerging global
classroom over the World Wide Web. This education effect could compound the
positive environmental and security benefits of MNT.
Relevant ecological and public health principles must be utilized
in conducting MNT R&D. Diamondoid products may not break down easily in the
natural environment. Furthermore, consumers may not at first have means readily
available to recycle them. Thus, total "product lifecycle" considerations should
be taken into consideration as the MNT industry develops.
Effective means of restricting the misuse of MNT in the
international arena need to be developed. Adding MNT to the list of technologies
covered in Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Weapons treaties might seem
appropriate, but it could lead to the unintended consequence that only the U.S.
and other rule following nations would be at a competitive disadvantage
economically and militarily. While most nations are likely to adhere to
reasonable restrictions, guidelines that are viewed as too restrictive will
simply be ignored, paradoxically increasing risk. While a 100% effective ban
could, in theory, avoid the potential risks of nanotechnology, a 99.99%
effective ban would result in development and deployment by the 0.01% that
evaded and ignored the ban. There are reasonable arguments on both sides of the
treaty question. However, at this time, the Guideline participants as a group do
not endorse any specific initiative to address MNT safety and security concerns
through treaty arrangements.
The safe development and use of MNT depends, in part, on the good
judgment of the researchers carrying out this work. The more clearly this is
recognized, the more effective researchers are likely to be in avoiding and
actively preventing unsafe uses of MNT and in insuring that commercial systems
have built-in safeguards. The "moral repugnance" associated with biological
weapons may have attenuated their development and use, in spite of the fact that
they are relatively easy to make and deploy.
Eventually, MNT policy will have to balance potential risks with
known benefits, and distinguish between different classes of risks. Molecular
Manufacturing and nanotechnology are not one thing, but rather a spectrum of
technologies, with radically different risk profiles. A substantial R&D
program is needed to clarify the nature, magnitude and likelihood of the
potential risks, as well as the options available for dealing with them
effectively.
There are significant risks associated with failing to address
ongoing economic and environmental problems that the development of MNT could
help resolve. The Guidelines were not intended to cover every risk or potential
abuse of the technology. People still abuse automobiles, and society has
responded both by making cars safer to operate, holding drivers accountable for
their actions through laws that are enforced, and requiring drivers to pay for
automobile insurance. Likewise, industry and governments are held responsible
for their use of technologies that have widespread impact.
The Guidelines are intended to cover most of the risks associated
with normal development and use of the technology, and to mitigate, as much as
possible, the risks associated with potential abuse of the technology. Informed
MNT policy could accelerate the safe development of peaceful and environmentally
responsible uses of the technology. This includes capturing the opportunity to
develop powerful new approaches to medicine, as well as energy efficient and
zero emission manufacturing and transportation technologies.
Principles
People who work in the MNT field should develop and utilize
professional guidelines that are grounded in reliable technology, and knowledge
of the environmental, security, ethical, and economic issues relevant to the
development of MNT.
MNT includes a wide variety of technologies that have very
different risk profiles. Access to the end products of MNT should be
distinguished from access to the various forms of the underlying development
technology. Access to MNT products should be unrestricted unless this access
poses a risk to global security.
Accidental or willful misuse of MNT must be constrained by legal
liability and, where appropriate, subject to criminal prosecution.
Governments, companies, and individuals who refuse or fail to
follow responsible principles and guidelines for development and dissemination
of MNT should, if possible, be placed at a competitive disadvantage with respect
to access to MNT intellectual property, technology, and markets.
MNT device designs should incorporate provisions for built-in
safety mechanisms, such as:
1) absolute dependence on a single artificial fuel source or
artificial "vitamins" that don't exist in any natural environment;
2) making devices that are dependent on broadcast transmissions
for replication or in some cases operation;
3) routing control signal paths throughout a device, so that
subassemblies do not function independently;
4) programming termination dates into devices, and
5) other innovations in laboratory or device safety technology
developed specifically to address the potential dangers of MNT. Further research
is needed on MNT risk management, as well as the theory, mechanisms, and
experimental designs for built-in safeguard systems.
The global community of nations and non-governmental organizations
need to develop effective means of restricting the misuse of MNT. Such means
should not restrict the development of peaceful applications of the technology
or defensive measures by responsible members of the international community.
Further research in this area is encouraged.
MNT research and development should be conducted with due regard
to existing principles of ecological and public health. MNT products should be
promoted which incorporate systems for minimizing negative ecological and public
health impact.
Any specific regulation adopted by researchers, industry or
government should provide specific, clear guidelines. Regulators should have
specific and clear mandates, providing efficient and fair methods for
identifying different classes of hazards and for carrying out inspection and
enforcement. There is great value in seeking the minimum necessary legal
environment to ensure the safe and secure development of this technology.
Development Principles:
1) Artificial replicators must not be capable of replication in a
natural, uncontrolled environment.
2) Evolution within the context of a self-replicating
manufacturing system is discouraged.
3) Any replicated information should be error free.
4) MNT device designs should specifically limit proliferation and
provide traceability of any replicating systems.
5) Developers should attempt to consider systematically the
environmental consequences of the technology, and to limit these consequences to
intended effects. This requires significant research on environmental models,
risk management, as well as the theory, mechanisms, and experimental designs for
built-in safeguard systems.
6) Industry self-regulation should be designed in whenever
possible. Economic incentives could be provided through discounts on insurance
policies for MNT development organizations that certify Guidelines compliance.
Willingness to provide self-regulation should be one condition for access to
advanced forms of the technology.
7) Distribution of molecular manufacturing development capability
should be restricted, whenever possible, to responsible actors that have agreed
to use the Guidelines. No such restriction need apply to end products of the
development process that satisfy the Guidelines.
Specific Design Guidelines:
1) Any self-replicating device which has sufficient onboard
information to describe its own manufacture should encrypt it such that any
replication error will randomize its blueprint.
2) Encrypted MNT device instruction sets should be utilized to
discourage irresponsible proliferation and piracy.
3) Mutation (autonomous and otherwise) outside of sealed
laboratory conditions, should be discouraged.
4) Replication systems should generate audit trails.
5) MNT device designs should incorporate provisions for built-in
safety mechanisms, such as: 1) absolute dependence on a single artificial fuel
source or artificial "vitamins" that don't exist in any natural environment; 2)
making devices that are dependent on broadcast transmissions for replication or
in some cases operation; 3) routing control signal paths throughout a device, so
that subassemblies do not function independently; 4) programming termination
dates into devices, and 5) other innovations in laboratory or device safety
technology developed specifically to address the potential dangers of MNT.
6) MNT developers should adopt systematic security measures to
avoid unplanned distribution of their designs and technical capabilities.
Background
The idea of guidelines for the safe development of MNT (Molecular
Nanotechnology) has been discussed within the Foresight community for over a
decade. It is inevitable that any guidelines put forth today will be further
discussed and perhaps substantively changed; but the dialog on specific
proposals must begin somewhere.
In spite of the diversity of briefing materials and views
represented at the Monterey workshop in February of 1999, the participants
managed to discuss the technical and policy issues with both intensity and
civility. While any one participant might have preferred more or less emphasis
on a particular issue, the group was able to converge on a common set of draft
guidelines for the development of MNT.
The group agreed to review the Guidelines among themselves,
discuss them in wider Foresight meetings during 1999, and then release them on
the WWW for review by the larger community. The goal was to get the Guidelines
endorsed and adopted by organizations sponsoring MNT research and development
projects, and to inspire effective self-regulation wherever necessary and
possible.
Another goal of the Workshop members was to educate MNT
researchers about the potential benefits and risks of the technology. The
long-term goal was to eventually produce a dialog and set of Guidelines that
would be useful to policy makers, the public, and the MNT research and
development community.
The Foresight Guidelines were intended as a living document,
subject to modification and revision. Early drafts have been reviewed and
revised several times since the Monterey workshop, including during
Foresight/IMM sponsored discussions led by Neil Jacobstein in May and November
of 1999. They were also provided in the attachments to Ralph Merkle's June 1999
Congressional testimony on MNT, and referenced in Neil Jacobstein's presentation
on Nanotechnology and Molecular Manufacturing: Opportunities and Risks at
Stanford University's Colloquium for Doug Engelbart in January of 2000. The
Workshop participants debated whether the Guidelines were sufficiently developed
for widespread publication, when Bill Joy's article: "Why the Future Doesn't
Need Us" was published in the April 2000 issue of Wired Magazine. This article
raised public awareness of the potential dangers of self-replicating
technologies, including nanotechnology.
Since that time, the Guidelines were reviewed critically by Robert
Freitas, and revised by Ralph Merkle and Neil Jacobstein. Version 3.6 of the
Guidelines was discussed in a May 2000 Foresight workshop session led by Neil
Jacobstein. Bill Joy was invited to participate in this discussion. He made
several constructive suggestions, including one that outlined a guideline on
closing the economic incentives loop via an insurance policy requirement for
developers. Jacobstein incorporated the feedback from this and subsequent
discussions into version 3.7 of the Guidelines, and they were then published for
open review on the web.
Version 3.7 of the Guidelines are available at the Foresight web
URL: http://www.foresight.org/guidelines/. This text, like most web text, can be
annotated using software called Crit, which enables in-line comments to be made
using a web browser. Information about the use of Crit can be found at
http://crit.org. We encourage your ideas and constructive criticism about how to
improve the Guidelines.
Eventually, the Guidelines need to become sufficiently specific
that they can form the basis for a legally enforceable framework within which
MNT development can be safely pursued. Future versions of the MNT Guidelines
might eventually be enforced via a variety of means, possibly including lab
certifications, randomized open inspections, professional society guidelines and
peer pressure, insurance requirements and policies, stiff legal and economic
penalties for violations, and other sanctions. Enforcement will be inherently
imperfect, but the deterrent effect of unpredictable inspection, combined with
predictable and swift consequences for violations, may prove preferable to the
available alternatives.
Care must be taken that future revisions of the Guidelines do not
become so restrictive that they simply drive MNT research and development
underground. This could expose compliant countries to the increased risks
associated with decreased technical, economic, and military capabilities. It
would also sacrifice the many significant economic, environmental, and medical
benefits of MNT that counteract serious and certain risks that society now faces
in industrialized countries and particularly in the developing world.
http://www.foresight.org/guidelines/current.html
Revised Draft Version
3.7: June 4, 2000
Principles
Background