Organized Crime, Drugs, and the CIA
Allegations of links between the CIA and the drug trade first came to
public attention in the 1970’s when a number of public officials came
forward with evidence of such links. One of these was a former police
officer in the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), Michael Ruppert. In
1977, as a result of his official investigation into the drug trade in
Los Angeles, Rupert uncovered evidence that the CIA
was playing an
active role in bringing drugs into New Orleans and Los Angeles. When Rupert disclosed this information to his superiors in the LAPD, he
became a target for surveillance, harassment and burglaries that
eventually led to his resignation. [67]
Another key official is a retired Drug Enforcement Agency agent,
Celerino Castillo III, who was the lead DEA agent in Guatemala and
discovered that the CIA was involved in the drug trade to raise finances
for its covert operations. In a written statement to the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence Castillo gave detailed information on a
number of drug running operations that involved cooperation between the
CIA and organized crime cartels. [68]
Celerino claimed:
The key to understanding the "crack cocaine" epidemic, which exploded on
our streets in 1984, lies in understanding the effect of congressional
oversight on covert operations. In this case the Boland amendment(s) of
the era, while intending to restrict covert operations as intended by
the will of the People, only served to encourage C.I.A., the military
and elements of the national intelligence community to completely bypass
the Congress and the Constitution in an eager and often used covert
policy of funding prohibited operations with drug money. [69]
Another prominent official was
Marine Colonel James Sebow, the third in
command of the El Toro Airbase, California, who discovered evidence that
C-130 cargo flights coming into the airbase from Central America were
filled with drugs. Sebow communicated his finding to the base commander,
Col Joseph Underwood, and then found himself along with Col Underwood,
subject to investigations for minor offenses, relieved of command and
threatened with Court Martial if he did not cooperate with the
investigation. On January 22, 1991, Sebow was found dead, apparently by
suicide, but an investigation by family members and supporters revealed
evidence that he in fact was murdered for what he had discovered. [70]
On the day before his death, Sebow’s widow recalled a conversation
Sebow
had with Col Underwood who had stopped by for a visit:
Underwood stopped by and repeatedly tried to talk
Jimmy into accepting
an early retirement to avoid a court-martial. Jimmy objected strongly.
At this, Underwood became quite angry. Sally stated, "I have never seen
such a vicious face as Joe's when Jimmy said he would not retire and
would take the entire matter to a court-martial if necessary. Underwood
jumped up and said, "You'll never go to a court-martial, and I mean
never!" [71]
The events surrounding Sebow’s death support allegations that he had
uncovered a CIA supported drug running operation into
the US, and was murdered to prevent this from being exposed.
In the July 12, 1985 personal notes of Oliver North, used by his legal
defense during his various trials and Congressional
hearings over his role in selling US weapons to Iran to fund the
Nicaraguan Contras, North reported that at a meeting involving
a number of NSC and CIA officials, $14 million was mentioned as the
funds the Contra rebels would raise from the drug trade.[72]
North’s
admission did not get serious press coverage despite the apparent
confirmation that the CIA was complicit
in the use of drugs as revenue for covert operations.[73] It can be
inferred that North’s efforts were an amateurish
effort by an NSC ‘basement team’ to raise revenue for
NSC covert
operations that was modeled on a far more successful
effort by the CIA to use revenue from the drug trade.
The best known case of an alleged link between the CIA and the drug
trade emerged from the pioneering investigative journalism of Gary Webb
in 1996 who published the “Dark Alliance” series in the San Jose Mercury
during Summer 1996. [74]
Webb presented a compelling case that the CIA played a role in allowing drug money to be used to fund the Contra
rebels in Nicaragua. While Webb’s series was focused on the proceeds of
drug activities going to the Contras, his conclusion that the CIA
colluded in this endeavor supported broader allegations of the CIA using
the drug trade to finance covert operations. Webb’s series of articles
generated intense national interest until the publication of
‘independent’ investigation by the Washington Post on October 4, 1996,
claimed there was insufficient evidence to support Webb’s allegations. [75]
The New York Times and Los Angeles Times followed up on October 20
with equally critical articles. [76] Criticisms began to mount and
eventually led to the editors of the San Jose Mercury apologizing for
‘errors’ in Webb’s Dark Alliance series, and had
Webb transferred to a
less prominent news bureau. [77]
Webb resigned in disgust in November,
1997, ending a nineteen year career as a journalist. It was subsequently
learned that one of the two writers of the Washington Post article,
Walter Marcus was a CIA asset, suggesting that the Post had been
co-opted into a covert campaign to undermine Webb’s work. The critical
stories in the New York Times and Los Angeles Times relied on similar
‘unnamed sources’ to the Post article indicating that Webb had become a
victim of a covert CIA operation through the ‘establishment’ newspapers
to discredit his findings. [78] In January 1998, the Inspector General
of the CIA released a report exonerating the CIA of any role in the drug
trade. [79]
Having so far determined the existence of a black budget created by the
CIA that circumvents Congressional intent on the use of appropriations
of different federal departments and agencies, and/or involves
laundering of funds possibly gained from organized crime and the drug
trade, it is worth estimating the size of the CIA’s black budget and
what it is used for.
Back to
Contents
Estimating the Size of the CIA’s ‘unofficial’ Black Budget
Using Fitts estimates of money missing from HUD, and knowledge of the
appropriations process, a more accurate figure of the CIA’s ‘unofficial’
black budget that feeds the intelligence community associated with DoD
can be estimated. It should be emphasized that it is only the CIA that
has Congressional authority to draw appropriations through other
government agencies without ‘without regard to any provisions of law’ or
‘intended use of appropriations’.
This means that money missing from the
Congressional appropriations of other agencies would be initially being
siphoned through the CIA and no other intelligence agency. Other
agencies in the intelligence community gather their appropriations
through the DoD that generates the ‘official’ black budget through
fictitious line items on its annual budget.
Consequently, it can be
concluded that appropriated money channeled through HUD and other
agencies is going into the CIA’s ‘unofficial’ black budget that in turn
goes directly into deep black programs within the DoD associated
intelligence agencies and specialized programs of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
The CIA’s ‘unofficial’ black budget would therefore not appear on the DoD budget as single line items but would be annually moved through the
DoD budgetary mechanisms in a way that cannot be financially tracked. A
description of the way this is done appears is described by Tim Weiner,
author of Blank Check: The Pentagon’s Black Budget:
One way the form [Form 1080, Voucher for Transfer Between Appropriations
and/or Funds] is used to allow money to flow from the Treasury to the
Army, or from one Army account to another, is for an officer to fill out
the 1080. The bursar then signs the form and issues a Treasury check.
The 1080 vouches that the money has been used to pay for the costs of
authorized programs. It creates an audit trail - a paper path showing
money flowing. [80]
An estimate of the size of the
CIA’s black budget, would therefore be
unaccounted movement of funds through the DoD. According to an
investigative journalist, Kelly O’Meara, the use of a range of
accounting mechanisms such as "unsupported entries," "material-control
weakness," "adjusted records," "unmatched disbursements," "abnormal
balances" and "unreconciled differences" are evidence of large sums of
money that are moved through the DoD that cannot be accounted for. [81]
Since the Inspector General of DoD has a certain degree of independence,
traces of the CIA black budget would appear in auditing anomalies using
some of the terms O’Meara describes. David K. Steensma, Acting Assistant
Inspector for auditing DoD wrote in a 2002 report that “DoD processed
$1.1 trillion in unsupported accounting entries to DoD Component
financial data used to prepare departmental reports and DoD financial
statements for FY 2000.” [82]
Elaborating on the significance of the DoD
Inspector General reports, O’Meara has written:
[T]he deputy IG [Inspector General] at the Pentagon read an eight-page
summary of DoD fiduciary failures. He admitted that $4.4 trillion in
adjustments to the Pentagon's books had to be cooked to compile the
required financial statements and that $1.1 trillion of that amount
could not be supported by reliable information. In other words, at the
end of the last full year on Bill Clinton's watch, more than $1 trillion
was simply gone and no one can be sure of when, where or to whom the
money went. [83]
According to the Office of the Inspector General, the accounting
irregularities for fiscal year 1999 were even larger and added up to 2.3
trillion dollars; and for fiscal year 1998, these irregularities were
1.7 trillion (see table 2 below).
Back to
Contents
Table 2. Department of Defense (DoD) – Unsupported Accounting
Entries 1998-2003
Fiscal
Year
|
Unsupported
Entries USD
|
Source
|
Highlighted
Quotes
|
2002
|
Not disclosed
due accounting irregularities
|
Independent
Auditor Report
|
“DoD financial
management and feeder systems cannot currently provide adequate evidence
to support various material amounts on the financial statements. Therefore
we did not perform auditing procures to support material amounts on
the financial statements." [84]
|
2001
|
Not disclosed
due accounting irregularities
|
Independent
Auditor Report
|
“We did
not obtain sufficient, competent evidentiary matter to support the
material line items on the financial statements … the scope of our
work was not sufficient to enable us to express, and we do not express,
an opinion on these financial statements" [85]
|
2000
|
1.1 trillion
|
Office
of Inspector General, Audit
|
“Of the
$4.4 trillion in department-level accounting entries, $2.8 trillion
were supported with proper research, reconciliation, and audit trails.
However, department-level accounting entries of $1.1 trillion were
unsupported or improper." [86]
|
1999
|
2.3 trillion
|
Office
of Inspector General, Audit
|
“… department-level
accounting entries of $2.3 trillion were made to force financial data
to agree with various sources of financial data without adequate research
and reconciliation, were made to force buyer and seller data to agree
in preparation for eliminating entries, did not contain adequate documentation
and audit trails, or did not follow accounting principles." [87]
|
1998
|
1.7 trillion
|
Inspector
General Statement
|
“…
final statements were more untimely than ever and a record $1.7 trillion
of unsupported adjustments were made in preparing the statements."
[88]
|
|
The Inspector General reports are important evidence that trillions of
dollars were siphoned through the Department of Defense (DoD) for the
fiscal years 1998-2002. [89] Using the Inspector General reports of
accounting anomalies, it can be estimated that Fitts and O’Meara’s
estimates of missing money from the DoD is a close approximation to the
CIA’s ‘unofficial’ black budget.
Consequently, the
CIA black budget is
annually in the vicinity of 1.1 trillion dollars – a truly staggering
figure when one considers that the DoD budget for 2004 will be
approximately 380 billion dollars. [90] This suggests that the vast size
of the DoD in terms of its personnel, weapons systems and research into
‘conventional weapons systems’, is dwarfed by something that in funding
terms is almost three times larger than the entire conventional military
system funded by the DoD budget.
The vast size of the estimated CIA ‘unofficial’ black budget
is strong
evidence of a collective effort by the CIA and DoD associated military
intelligence agencies and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to fund a network
of highly classified projects so large in scope that they collectively
dwarf the original
Manhattan Project conducted at Los Alamos National
Laboratories during the Second World War. [91]
Since the
original
Manhattan Project aimed to develop an atomic bomb for use in the war
against Nazi Germany, it can be inferred that the network of projects
funded by the CIA’s black budget aims to develop a range of advanced
weapons systems and intelligence capabilities for use against an
adversary whose existence and identity still remains classified. [92] I
will henceforth refer to this network of highly classified projects as
the second Manhattan Project - ‘Manhattan II’
is the ultimate
beneficiary of the CIA’s ‘unofficial’ black budget.
Back to
Contents
Conventional Oversight System for the CIA’s and DoD’s Classified
Programs
Oversight of the Manhattan II would predictably have been a major
concern for the Truman Administration that was instrumental in the
passage of the National Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1949
that institutionalized the black budget that would fund Manhattan II.
Major considerations of the Truman administration would have been to
create an oversight body dominated by professionals that would not be
affected by the partisan political process or by the new political
appointees that came and went with each Presidential administration.
Consequently, an oversight system would have evolved comprising
individuals appointed either due to the technical abilities (e.g.,
scientists), political skills (e.g., international diplomacy experts),
or military expertise (e.g., J-2 & J-3 directorates in the Joint Chiefs
of Staff).
This oversight system would have most likely evolved in a
manner that was independent of the conventional oversight system for
classified projects. Consequently, before considering how oversight of
the Black Budget and Manhattan II are conducted, it is worth exploring
how the conventional oversight system works for classified programs in
the CIA and DoD.
This conventional oversight system for highly classified intelligence
activities and/or covert projects concerns Controlled Access Programs (CAPs)
of the intelligence community or Special Access Programs (SAP) of the DoD. CAPs/SAPs are programs that have additional security measures
attached to them over and above the normal classificatory system
(confidential, secret, top-secret) attached to most classified
information and programs. [93]
CAPs/SAPs are divided into two classes
‘acknowledged’ and ‘unacknowledged’ as described in a 1997 Senate
Commission Report:
“Publicly acknowledged programs are considered
distinct from unacknowledged programs, with the latter colloquially
referred to as “black” programs because their very existence and purpose
are classified.” [94]
A ‘waived’
CAP/SAP is so sensitive that only eight members of Congress
(the chairs and ranking members of the four intelligence [or defense]
committees divided between the House of Representatives and Senate) are
notified of a waived CAP/SAP without being given any information about
it. [95]
This would enable them to truthfully declare no knowledge of
such a program if asked, thereby maintaining secrecy of this CAP/SAP. If
unacknowledged CAPs/SAPs are ‘black programs’, then ‘waived’
unacknowledged CAPs/SAPs are ‘deep black’. The most secret of the
intelligence and covert operations conducted by the CIA are ‘deep black’ CAPs.
CAPs are funded through the ‘official’ black budget and in theory are
subject to both Executive and Congressional oversight. [96] In practice
though, Congressional oversight in the case of waived acknowledged
CAPs
is nominal as revealed by the 1997 Senate Commission Report. President
Clinton’s Executive Order 12958 issued on April 17, 1995, reformed how
CAPs/SAPs would in future be created and oversight established.
The main
component of the Executive Order was that only the Director of Central
Intelligence or the Secretaries of State, Defense and Energy (or their
principal deputies) could create a CAP/SAP. CAPs/SAPs would be kept to
an “absolute minimum”; and would be created when “the vulnerability of,
or threat to, specific information is exceptional,” and their secrecy
cannot be protected by the normal classification system. [97]
As far as oversight was concerned, the key clause in Executive Order
12958 was an effort by the Clinton Administration to coordinate
oversight through a central executive office (Information Security
Oversight Office) that would be responsible to the National Security
Council (NSC) and annually report to the President. [98] The President’s
effort to centralize and coordinate oversight features of CAPs/SAPs
was
resisted by both the Defense and Intelligence communities.
While in
theory, oversight coordination occurs in the Information Security
Oversight Office set up in the NSC that issues an annual report to the
President; the power to approve or terminate a CAP/SAP lies with the
respective intelligence community and DoD committees and executive
officers. In general, Executive Office oversight of CAPs/SAPs has been
described as “nothing more than a sop used to placate anyone who
questions the propriety of an administration’s covert action policy.”
[99]
Oversight of CAPs/SAPs is performed by a committee comprising officials
from the Intelligence Community, the Controlled Access Program Oversight
Committee (CAPOC); and a similar committee in the DoD, the Special
Access Program Oversight Committee (SAPOC). [100] CAPOC reviews CAPs and
Sensitive Compartmented Information (intelligence data) in the
intelligence community annually and can recommend their
‘compartmentation’ or termination. [101] It is however, only the
Director or Deputy Director of the CIA that has the authority to
“create, modify, or terminate controlled access programs.” [102]
While CAPOC provides more direct oversight and coordination of
CAPs, it
is not ultimately the body that oversees the CIA’s most secret projects
conducted in collaboration with the military intelligence community. The
exclusion of some CIA CAPs from CAPOC is indicated in the following
Directive from the Director of the CIA (DCI):
“The DCI or DDCI
may waive
review by the CAPOC for programs covered by equivalent oversight
mechanisms, or when review by the CAPOC is unnecessary to carry out the
DCI's responsibilities.” [103]
Essentially, if the DCI deems it
unnecessary for CAPOC to provide oversight information of a CAP, then
CAPOC plays no role in monitoring the program.
While the DCI is legally obliged to verbally notify Congress of the
CIA’s most sensitive CAPs without providing specific budgetary or
operational details, there is no independent way of confirming if he
indeed is doing so. Similarly, the DCI could similarly withhold
information of the CIA’s most sensitive CAPs to the National Security
Council’s ‘Information Security Oversight Office” (ISOO).
The extent to which authority is vested in the different security
agencies is the way in which program managers of CAPs/SAPs have the
authority to come up with their own rules concerning access and
security. A 1994 Commission Report stated:
The special access system gave the program manager the ability to decide
who had a need-to-know and thus to strictly control access to the
information. But elaborate, costly, and largely separate structures
emerged. According to some, the system has grown out of control with
each SAP [CAP] program manager able to set independent security rules.
[104]
Program managers of CAPs/SAPs have the power to restrict access and
information to the heads of Congressional Intelligence Oversight
Committees, and even to the NSC’s Information Security Oversight Office.
Consequently, operational control of CAPs and SAPs is firmly maintained
by CAP/SAP program managers who answer only to their immediate superiors
despite the fact that they are funded by the CIA’s unofficial black
budget with the explicit support of the DCI.
Consequently there are
two
categories of waived CAPs/SAPs or ‘deep black programs’:
-
those CAPs/SAPs
where oversight is exercised by the relevant oversight committees in the
CIA, DoD and the Executive Office;
-
and those CAPs where the program
managers answer to an entirely different oversight body. I now explore
whom it is that does provide oversight of the CIA’s ‘unofficial’ Black
Budget and Manhattan II.
Back to Contents
Oversight of the CIA’s ‘Unofficial’ Black Budget & Manhattan II
Considering the vast size and unconventional funding source for
Manhattan II, it is worth exploring how oversight of both the
CIA’s
‘unofficial’ black budget and of Manhattan II has evolved, and whom
program managers for projects funded by the CIA’s unofficial black
budget actually answer to.
The vastness and secrecy surrounding
Manhattan II from its inception sometime during the Truman
Administration places it outside of the conventional political process
where the appointment of key civilian leaders is subject to partisan
politics that could compromise the secrecy of Manhattan II and the black
budget that funds it. In contrast, the conventional political process
has little direct influence on the appointment of senior military
personal who undergo a process of first being recommended to the
President by the relevant DoD promotions boards, then appointed by the
President and finally confirmed by the Senate.
While the military
leadership of the DoD is outside the partisan political arena, this is
not the case for the appointment of the civilians who take on key
positions as Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, and Undersecretaries of
the different military services in the DoD with each new administration.
It is very likely that the senior military officials in key bodies such
as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are aware of Manhattan II without having
detailed knowledge of the black budget that funds it. It is likely that
the politically appointed leaders of the DoD have little substantive
knowledge of Manhattan II, and have as their chief task the goal of
ensuring secrecy of Manhattan II and of the CIA generated ‘black budget’
that feeds it.
Thus the Secretary of Defense would play no formal
oversight of Manhattan II, far less of the black budget that sustains
it. The operational side of Manhattan II, in terms of product testing
and application, is most likely be controlled by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Directorates for Intelligence (J-2) and Operations
(J-3)
that are responsible for intelligence and operational functions of the DoD.
It is unlikely that the Director of the CIA (DCI) is made fully aware of
the extent of the ‘unofficial’ black budget, the activities used to
raise money for it, and the second Manhattan project it funds. The
DCI like all agency and department heads appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate is subject to the partisan political process. Up
to the Carter Administration, the tradition was that the appointment DCI
would not be politicized.
However, President Gerald Ford effectively
abandoned this with the appointment of George Bush as DCI in 1975. [105]
President Carter appointed Admiral Stansfield Turner as the
new DCI in
1977, who in turn was replaced by William Casey as the new DCI by
President Reagan in 1981. Given the partisan political nature of the DCI
since Bush, it is likely much of the budgetary authority of the DCI
was
secretly delegated by executive authority to a body that formally plays
the key oversight role for the ‘unofficial’ black budget, and the covert
projects it funds that make up Manhattan II. [106]
The delegated powers
would most likely have derived from the Truman administration in the
form of an executive order and/or National Security Council directive
not published in the US Federal Gazette that is required for all
executive orders, and thereby remains secret. [107] Such an executive
order/NSC directive would been reconfirmed and gradually expanded by
subsequent administrations so that ultimate oversight of the black
budget and of Manhattan II remained firmly outside of the conventional
oversight process.
Consequently, effective oversight of Manhattan II, comes from an
‘executive committee’ especially established in a way that would make it
immune to the partisan political process thus ensuring strict secrecy
can be preserved, and politically motivated leaks prevented. The power
and resources delegated to this ‘executive oversight committee’ for
Manhattan II by the Executive Office, and its role in ensuring that
‘black budget’ funds are correctly used and kept secret from the general
public, justifies a description of it as a
‘shadow government’.
Back to Contents
Conclusion
The method used in guiding the analysis in this report is to simply
follow the money trail created by the CIA’s black budget that enables a
number of important insights to be drawn by the institutions playing key
roles in generating, protecting and distributing black budget funds.
Critical in this analysis has been the experience of individuals and
companies such as Catherine Fitts and Hamilton Securities that
experienced what evidence indicates was a CIA orchestrated covert
campaign to discredit the financial tracking reforms that threatened to
make more transparent the financial flows of HUD and other government
agencies.
The systematic accounting problems experienced by HUD and
other agencies points to the existence of an unofficial black budget of
up one trillion dollars annually. The size of the black budget and the
CIA activities used to generate funds for it, point to a vast secret
network of projects that is funded outside of the normal Congressional
appropriation process. Consequently, what follows is a discussion of
some of the primary conclusions that can be drawn and arguments made
concerning the CIA’s ‘unofficial’ black budget and the
Manhattan II
project it has been argued to fund.
It is worth repeating that the CIA is legally authorized by Congress to
transfer, “without regard to any provisions of law”,
funds from other
government agencies for the generation of a black budget. There is
strong evidence that the CIA uses this power to disregard law to
complement whatever funds it can generate through Congressional
appropriations, with funds gained through the drugs trade and organized
crime that is laundered through different government agencies.
The total
annual sum of the black budget is best estimated in the form of
accounting anomalies in the main departmental recipient of all black
budget funds, the DoD, and is in the vicinity of 1.1 trillion dollars
that funds a network of classified intelligence activities and covert
operations that collectively form a second Manhattan Project.
The oversight of Manhattan project occurs outside of the conventional
oversight system that can be easily compromised by partisan politics.
The oversight system that has evolved has been very successful in
dividing different functions for Manhattan II in ways that balance
institutional rivalries between national security organizations without
compromising secrecy.
Thus the CIA generates the black budget that in
turns transfers these funds to projects that are institutionally located
in the military intelligence and special operations units of the DoD.
The various military intelligence agencies in turn hire private
contractors and/or provide the necessary military resources for these
covert programs to be conducted in national laboratories, military
bases, private corporations or other classified locations.
The program
managers of each of the classified projects associated with Manhattan II
answer directly to an ‘executive committee’ that is outside of the
regular oversight process in DoD, CIA, Congress and the Executive
Office. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have control of the testing and
applications of Manhattan II products that are conducted in
collaboration with the intelligence community. The respective
intelligence, defense and appropriations committees in the US Congress
provide legitimacy for Manhattan II and the black budget that funds it
by not revoking the budgetary powers allocated to the CIA through the
1949 CIA Act.
Finally, the Executive Office through the National
Security Council issues the necessary executive orders/NSC directives to
coordinate the functions and activities in all the branches of
government in order to secretly run Manhattan II. Thus each branch of
the national security system plays an important role in Manhattan II,
without being fully in control of it, thereby insuring a division of
powers according to different functions required for Manhattan II.
Effective oversight of Manhattan II, however, comes from an ‘executive
committee’ that is immune to the partisan political process and whose
oversight power and control of resources makes it virtually a ‘shadow
government’.
It needs to be emphasized that the ‘unofficial’ black budget and
Manhattan Project have legally evolved in ways to respond to a national
security contingency that is yet to be revealed to the American public.
The classified adversary that this elaborate secret system has been
developed to respond to is arguably a potential threat that warrants an
extraordinary network of covert programs that dwarf the original
Manhattan Project and annually consume as much as 1.1 trillion dollars
in a non-transparent manner. More disturbingly, the importance of
Manhattan II is such that the CIA has evidently used organized criminal
networks and the drug trade as sources to partially fund Manhattan II.
It is unclear when the full scope and impact of Manhattan II will be
disclosed to the American public. However, the consequences in terms of
increased loss of trust in federal government agencies, loss of morale
among senior agency officials instructed to cover up black budget
transactions, non-transparency in the flow of government appropriations,
targeting of policy makers and business leaders who discover the
fraudulent accounting and money laundering that occurs with the black
budget, all warrant a serious examination of the need for maintaining
the secrecy of Manhattan II and the black budget that funds it.
Finally,
the classified adversary against whom Manhattan II is directed requires
immediate declassification due to the inherent dangers of dealing with
what appears to be an undisclosed security threat in a non-transparent
and unaccountable manner, and totally outside of the moral/legal
restrictions that emerge from vigorous public debate in democratic
societies.
Back to Contents
ENDNOTES
[1]
I wish to acknowledge H.M. for his hospitality, intellectual
stimulation and research facilities for the completion of this
paper. Many thanks to A.M. for his assistance in printing and
distributing this report.
[2]
50 United States Code (U.S.C.) 403j(b). For an online database of
all federal statutes codified in the USC, go to:
http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/index.html
[3]
See Tim Weiner, Blank Check: The Pentagon’s Black Budget (Warner
Books, 1990) 118
[4]
95 Congressional Record 1945 (1949). Also quoted in Weiner, Blank
Check, 119
[5]
50 U.S.C. 403f(a)
[6]
This occurred to Catherine Austin Fitts whose work in detailing the
black budget will be examined later.
[7]
Cited in Fletcher Prouty, The Secret Team,
http://www.ratical.org/ratville/JFK/ST/STchp3ii.html
[8]
Data comes from a declassified CIA document detailing its projected
budget for fiscal year 1953, “Location of Budgeted Funds for Fiscal
Year 1953,” CIA, 15 February, 1952, available online at:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/cia1953bud.pdf
[9]
Converting 1953 dollars into 2002 dollars, I used the conversion
factor 0.175. For more details see, “Consumer Price Index (CPI)
Conversion Factors to Convert into 2002 dollars,”
http://oregonstate.edu/Dept/pol_sci/fac/sahr/cv2002rs.pdf
[10] Quoted
in Weiner, Blank Check, 218.
[11] Quoted
in Weiner, Blank Check, 219.
[12] Quoted
in Weiner, Blank Check, 220-21.
[13] Quoted
in Weiner, Blank Check, 222. Richardson v. U.S. 465 F. 2d 844, 853,
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 1972.
[14] For the
courts ruling as well as dissenting opinions, see U.S. v. Richardson
(418 U.S. 166) 167-202.
[15] For
further discussion see “The CIA’s Secret Funding and the
Constitution,” 84 Yale Law Journal 613 (1975).
[16]
See
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Whether Disclosure of Funds
for the Intelligence Activities of the United States Is in the
Public Interest, Report No. 95-274, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, June
16, 1977 (Government Printing Office, 1977). Also quoted in Weiner,
Blank Check, 137-38
[17] See
Weiner, Blank Check, 138.
[18] FOIA was
enacted in 1966 as Title 5 of the United States Code, section 552.
For online information, see
http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/referenceguidemay99.htm
[19] See “FAS
Sues CIA for Intelligence Budget Disclosure,”
http://www.fas.org/sgp/foia/ciafoia.html
[20] For a
copy of the lawsuit, see “FAS Sues CIA for Intelligence Budget
Disclosure,”
http://www.fas.org/sgp/foia/ciafoia.html . For a
website describing the Intelligence Community, go to
http://www.intelligence.gov/
.
[21] See
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Amendment
No.416 Congressional Record: June 19, 1997 (Senate) p. S5963-S5978];
Available online at:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/s858.html
[22] “House
Debate on Intelligence Budget Disclosure,” Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Congressional Record: July
9, 1997 (House)] p. H4948-H4985. Available online at:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/hbudg.html
[23] See
“Statement of the Director of Central Intelligence Regarding the
Disclosure of the Aggregate Intelligence Budget for Fiscal Year
1997,”
http://www.fas.org/sgp/foia/victory.html
[24]
Marchetti and Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (Alfred
Knopf, 1974) 61, 81.
[25] Wise,
The American Police State (Random House, 1976) 185.
[26] See
Federation of Atomic Scientists,
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/budget1.htm
[27] The
conversion ration is 0.908 to convert from 1998 to 2002, see
“Consumer Price Index (CPI) Conversion Factors to Convert into 2002
dollars,”
http://oregonstate.edu/Dept/pol_sci/fac/sahr/cv2002rs.pdf
[28] See Mari
Kane, “On the Money Trail: The dangerous world of Catherine Austin
Fitts,” North Bay Bohemian, September 5-11, 2002:
http://www.metroactive.com/papers/sonoma/09.05.02/fitts-0236.html
[29] See
Kane, “On the Money Trail,” North Bay Bohemian (September 5-11,
2002). Available online at:
http://www.metroactive.com/papers/sonoma/09.05.02/fitts-0236.html
[30] See
Kane, “On the Money Trail,”
http://www.metroactive.com/papers/sonoma/09.05.02/fitts-0236.html
[31] See
Kane, “On the Money Trail,”
http://www.metroactive.com/papers/sonoma/09.05.02/fitts-0236.html
[32]
See Uri
Dowbenky, “HUD Fraud, Spooks and the Slumlords of Harvard,”
Bushwacked: Inside Stories of True Conspiracies (National Liberty
Press, 2003) 1-18. Available online at:
http://www.conspiracydigest.com/bushwhacked.html
[33] Paul M.
Rodriquez, “Mortgage Scandal - HUD Gives Up With Fitts,” Insight On
the News, available online at:
http://www.insightmag.com/main.cfm?include=detail&storyid=161204
[34] See
Fitts, “Summary of Events As of February, 2001:
http://www.solari.com/media/summary.html
[35]
Catherine Austin Fitts, “Experience with FHA-HUD Background
Information for Unanswered Questions,” June 2003. Available online
at:
http://solari.com/gideon/fhalist.htm
[36] See
Kelly Patricia O’Meara, “Why Is $59 Billion Missing From HUD?”
Insight on News (Nov 6, 2000). Available online at:
http://www.insightmag.com/main.cfm?include=detail&storyid=246245
[37] Susan
Gaffney , “Audit Results for the Department of Housing and Urban
Development," Testimony before a hearing of the Subcommittee on
Government Management, Information, and Technology (March 22, 2000
1999). Available online at:
http://www.whereisthemoney.org/59billion.htm
and
http://www.hud.gov/offices/oig/data/reform.pdf
[38] Quoted
in Kelly Patricia O’Meara, “Why Is $59 Billion Missing From HUD?”
Insight on News (Nov 6, 2000).
http://www.insightmag.com/main.cfm?include=detail&storyid=246245
[39] Quoted
in Kelly Patricia O’Meara, “Why Is $59 Billion Missing From HUD?”
Insight on News (Nov 6, 2000).
http://www.insightmag.com/main.cfm?include=detail&storyid=246245
[40] “HUD’s
Financial Woes Continue,” Insight On the News (April 18, 2003).
Available online at:
http://www.insightmag.com/news/421370.html
[41]
For
discussion of the difficulties encountered by Fitts’ company, see
Paul Rodriquez, “Thankless Task,” Insight on the News (May 21,
2001). Available online at:
http://www.insightmag.com/main.cfm/include/detail/storyid/210955.html
[42]
Catherine Fitts, “The Myth of the Rule of Law or How Money Works:
The Destruction of Hamilton Securities.” SRA Quarterly: Third
Quarter Commentary (London, 2001) 2. Available online at:
http://www.solari.com/gideon/q301.pdf
[43]
Dowbenky,
Bushwacked, available online at:
http://www.conspiracydigest.com/bushwhacked.html
[44] Dowbenky,
Bushwacked, available online at:
http://www.conspiracydigest.com/bushwhacked.html
[45] Dowbenky, Bushwacked, available online at:
http://www.conspiracydigest.com/bushwhacked.html
[46]
See Fitts, “Summary of Events,”
http://www.solari.com/media/summary.html
[47] For background information on Judge Sporkin,
see “Stanley Sporkin, Bio & Selected CIA Iran Contra Background,”
http://www.solari.com/media/SporkinBio.html
[48] Fitts’ own conclusion was that the CIA was
indeed involved in the destruction of Hamilton, but her view was
that HUD was being used to launder money from the illicit drug
trade. Catherine Fitts, “The Myth of the Rule of Law or How Money
Works,” SRA Quarterly, 5.
[49] Report of Senator Fred Thompson, Chairman,
Committee on Governmental Affairs, on Management Challenges Facing
the New Administration (US Senate, 2002) available online at:
http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/vol1.pdf
[50]
Special Access and Covert Access programs
will be described later in this report.
[51] For history of OSS, See Michael Warner,
“Office of Strategic Services,”
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/oss/foreword.htm
[52] See State Department history of Intelligence
Services,
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/intro.html
[53] See 50 U.S.C. 401
[54] The Intelligence Community website is:
http://www.intelligence.gov/
[55]
50 U.S.C. 404(b).
[56] 50USC403-4(c)
[57] 50 U.S.C. 403-5(a)
[58] 50 U.S.C.403-6(a)
[59] Statistics on the estimated budgets and
personnel of the different intelligence agencies are available
online at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/commission/budget.htm
[60] 10 USC114. Available online at:
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/stApIch2.html
[61] The relevant Congressional statutes for SAPs
is 10 U.S.C.119
[62] 50 U.S.C.403j (b)
[63]
50USC403q (b)(3)
[64] 5a U.S.C.3(a)
[65] 10 U.S.C.114. Available online at:
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/stApIch2.html
[66] See Gary Webb, The Dark Alliance (Seven
Stories Press, 1998). For online information on the connection
between the CIA and the drug trade, see Michael Rupert’s ‘From The
Wilderness’ website:
http://www.fromthewilderness.com/
[67] For a brief summary of Rupert’s background,
see “Opening Remarkks of Michael C. Rupert for the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence,” available online at
http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ciadrugs/ssci.html
[68] “Written Statement of Celerino Castillo III
(D.E.A., Retired) to the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence,” April 27, 1998. Celerino’s statement is available
online at:
http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ciadrugs/contra1.html
[69]
Castillo, “Written Statement,” available
at:
http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ciadrugs/contra1.html
[70] See David Zucchino, The suicide files: Death
in the military----last of a four part series,” The Philadelphia
Inquirer, December 22, 1993. Available online at:
http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/RANCHO/POLITICS/MENA/suicide4.html
. See also Gary Null, “The Strange Death of Col Sabow,” available
online at:
http://www.garynull.com/documents/sabow.htm
[71] Gary Null, “The Strange Death of Col Sabow,”
http://www.garynull.com/documents/sabow.htm
[72]
Lawrence E. Walsh, Final Report of the
Independent Counsel for Iraq/Contra Matters, Vol 1. (United States
Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1993) ch. 21.
Available on line at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_21.htm
[73] See Michael Ruppert, “A CIA Confession:
Oliver North Exposed,” From the Wilderness, October 21, 1998.
Available online at:
http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ciadrugs/volii.html
[74]
Webb subsequently wrote the book, Dark
Alliance (Seven Stories Press, 1998).
[75] See Robert Suro and Walter Pincus, “The CIA
and Crack: Evidence is Lacking of Alleged Plot,” Washington Post,
October 4, 1996. See also Webb, Dark Alliance, 448-50.
[76] See “Tale of CIA and Drugs Has Life of Its
Own,” New York Times, October 20, 1996. The Los Angeles Times
articles ran over three days beginning October 20. See also Webb,
Dark Alliance, 452-55.
[77]
See Webb, Dark Alliance, 461-65.
[78] Webb, Dark Alliance, 450-52.
[79] Inspector General, CIA, “Report of
Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA
and The Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States (Office
of Inspector General Investigations Staff, CIA, January 29, 1998)
Vols 1-2. Available online at:
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/cocaine/report/index.html
[80] Weiner, Blank Check, 178-79.
[81] Kelly Patricia O’Meara, “Government Fails
Fiscal-Fitness Test,” Insight on the News (April 29, 2002).
Available online at:
http://www.insightmag.com/news/246188.html
[82] David K. Steensma, “Agency Wide Financial
Statements. The Department of Defense Audit Opinion.” (February 26,
2002) The Report can be viewed online at:
http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/fy02/02-055.pdf
[83] Kelly Patricia O’Meara, “Rumsfeld Inherits
Financial Mess,” Insight on the News (Aug. 10, 2001). Available
online at:
http://www.insightmag.com/main.cfm?include=detail&storyid=139530
. Another media report on the 1.1 trillion missing dollars is Tom
Abate, Military waste under fire $1 trillion missing – Bush plan
targets Pentagon accounting, San Francisco Chronicle (May 18, 2003.
Available online at:
http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/DODtrillions.html#p6
[84] Independent Auditor's Report on the
Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2002 Agency-Wide Principal
Financial Statements (1/15/03) Project D2002FI-0104.000, part III,
p. 225,
http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/
[85] Independent Auditor's Report on the
Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2001 Agency-Wide Financial
Statements (02/26/02), Report No. D-2002-055,
http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/
[86] Office of the Inspector General, Compilation
of the FY 2000 DoD Agency-Wide Financial Statements -- Report No.
D-2001-181(PDF)-Project No. D2001FI-0018.003
http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/
[87]
Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General – Audit,
“Department-Level Accounting Entries for FY 1999” Report No.
D-2000-179 (PDF)
http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/
[88]
Testimony: Statement of Eleanor Hill, Inspector General, Department
of Defense, Before the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management
Support Senate Armed Services Committee, United States Senate on
Defense Financial Management (04/14/99)
http://www.dodig.osd.mil/Audit/reports/
[89]
See Fitts, “Real Deal, Saving Tennessee,”
Scoop UQ Wire (July 4, 2002). Available online at:
http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0207/S00031.htm#a
Fitts has a website with a number of resources describing how more
than a trillion dollars are annually unaccounted for in a number of
government agencies. Go to
http://www.solari.com
[90] “Fiscal 2004 Department of Defense Budget
Release,” Defense Link, February 03, 2003. Available online at:
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2003/b02032003_bt044-03.html
[91] See Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told:
The Story of the Manhattan Project (Da Capo Press, 1983).
[92] For an intriguing description of what the
black budget funds and the ‘classified adversary’, see Catherine
Fitts, “The $64 Question: What's Up With the Black Budget? – The
Real Deal,” Scoop: UQ Wire (23 September, 2002). Available online
at:
http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0209/S00126.htm . For a
more conventional assessment of potential future adversaries, see
Judy Chizek, “Military Transformation: Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance” (Congressional Research Service, Library of
Congress, May 2002). Available online at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31425.pdf
[93] For an overview of the classification
system, see Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing
Government Secrecy: 1997. Available online at:
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secrecy/index.html
[94] Report of the Commission on Protecting and
Reducing Government Secrecy: 1997. Available online at:
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secrecy/index.html
[95] Report of the Commission on Protecting and
Reducing Government Secrecy, 26. Available online at:
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secrecy/index.html
[96] For a slightly though still excellent
overview of oversight mechanisms for the CIA, see “The Need to Know:
The Report of the Twenthieth Century Fund Task Force on Covert
Action and American Democracy” (The Twentieth Century Fund Press,
1992).
[97] Office of the Press Secretary, “White House
Press Release: Classified National Security Information,” Executive
Order #12958 (April 17, 1995) Section 4.4. Available online at:
http://foia.state.gov/eo12958/part4.asp#rtt
[98] Executive Order #12958 (April 17, 1995).
Available online at:
http://foia.state.gov/eo12958/part4.asp#rtt
[99] “The Need to Know: The Report of the
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Covert Action and American
Democracy,” 71.
[100] See, Director of Central Intelligence,
“Controlled Access Program Oversight Committee,” Directive 3: 29
(June 1995)
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid3-29.html . For the DoD oversight body, see Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Special Access
Program Oversight Committee,” Information Bulletin: November 1994.
Available online at:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/sapoc.html .
[101]
For description of the functions of CAPOC
see Director of Central Intelligence, “Controlled Access Program
Oversight Committee,” Directive 3: 29 (June 1995) Article 3.3.
Available online at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid3-29.html .
[102] Director of Central Intelligence,
“Controlled Access Program Oversight Committee,” Directive 3: 29
(June 1995) Article 2.4. Available online at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid3-29.html .
[103]
Director of Central Intelligence, “Controlled Access Program
Oversight Committee,” Directive 3: 29 (June 1995) Article 3.2.
Available online at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid3-29.html
[104] Joint Security Commission Redefining
Security: A Report to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
Central Intelligence (Washington, D.C., February 28, 1994)
http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/jsc/chap2.html
[105] John Helgerson, CIA Briefings with
Presidential Candidates (Central Intelligence Agency, 1996,) ch. 5,
available online at:
http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/briefing/cia-8.htm
[106] See Harold Relyea, “Presidential
Directives: Background and Overview,” available online at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/98-611.pdf
[107] For an overview of Presidential Directives
and executive power to create new bodies and delegate authority
without Congressional approval, see Harold Relyea, “Presidential
Directives: Background and Overview” (Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress, February 2003) Available online at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/98-611.pdf.
Back to Contents
|