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The Social and Political Impacts on
Emerging Markets
of Recent Economic Events
Moderator:
Marie-Josée Kravis
Speakers :
Stanley Fischer
William J. McDonough
James D. Wolfensohn
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AS THE moderator argued in her introduction, the backlash against
globalization in many developing countries has been from some
perspectives surprisingly muted. All the same the panellists argued
that it was impossible to understand either the cause or the cures
of the Asian contagion without taking into account
non-financial factors, such as the quality of the government, the
integrity of the legal system and the prevalence of corruption. Some
participants thought that the West needed to put more
effort into tackling these things before lending money. Others
thought the International Financial Institutions
should stick to what they know about rather that engage in
broad-ranging social engineering.
FIRST PANELLIST
There are plenty of important non-financial things that have
contributed to the spread of the Asian crisis, and
also must be part of any cure. These begin with the quality of
government: a $57 billion aid package is unlikely to be successful
if the government is incompetent and corrupt. Another challenge is
the legal system. Countries with property rights and good bankruptcy
systems have a much better chance of surviving the storm than those
that do not. Many countries sell jobs as judges to the highest
bidder: in the Caucuses, for example, many of the wealthiest people
are all judges. Then there is the regulatory framework, and finally,
the social safety net.
The people who suffer most from economic dislocation are almost
always the poor. In Russia as many as 50 million
people live on less than $4 a day. Two hundred thousand people have
been thrown out of work in the coal mines, threatening social
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unrest. In South Korea, the poor are still suffering,
and the biggest need there is for more structural reform. South
Korea was enormously lucky that it elected a reforming president
just before the financial system collapsed. Kim used his
opportunities to push through structural reform and even set up a
social safety net in Korea. Kim now faces an even more
intractable problem: the fact that the economy has bounced back
without the reform program being completed.
No reform program will be complete without the active participation
of business. Seven years ago $30 billion a year flowed into emerging
markets. Last year the figure was $300 billion. Engaging business is
not just a matter for theoretical debate. It is crucial.
SECOND PANELLIST
The International Monetary Fund is controlled by 24
executive directors, eight from single countries, the rest from
groups of countries. Countries vote in proportion to the number of
shares they control in the organization: the United States
has 18% of the votes, the G7 has half, meaning that a
united West cannot really lose a vote. Everything the IMF
does is voted on. But contested votes are rare: decisions are by
consensus, with the consensus usually put together outside the
boardroom. The IMF’s legitimacy results from the fact
that it was established by international treaty with more or less
universal membership. It sticks very close to its original articles
of agreement.
Corruption is a huge problem in the Fund’s
work. In Kenya, for example, hundreds of millions of
dollars worth of reserves have been paid out to businessmen and
politicians. The IMF clearly cannot lend developing
countries money if is likely to be stolen; but without IMF
loans their economies are likely to decline still further. Before
giving a large loan to Indonesia the Fund
had to deal with corruption, particularly the forestation fund,
which represented 2% of GDP but had never been
properly accounted for in the budget and provided the president’s
family with monopolies. Was the Fund’s decision to
fight corruption
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destabilizing? Perhaps. But the real cause of instability was the
system itself.
The International Financial Institutions are facing increasing
pressure to use their might to democratize countries. They should
not just consult with the government, they are being told, but with
interest groups of all descriptions. They are increasingly
responding to this pressure. But is it really their job to get
countries to accept values and standards that are not rooted in
economics? Pushing for the implementation of the International
Declaration of Human Rights, for example, is very far from the
traditional role of financial institutions.
THIRD PANELLIST
The best way to solve the economic and social problems associated
with crises maybe to prevent boom-bust cycles from happening. In
America, where these cycles have successfully been resisted, high
school dropouts are extraordinary successful at getting new jobs.
Boom-bust cycles are particularly bad for emerging markets. The poor
are hardest hit. There is no safety net to catch them when they
fall. And the middle class is devastated. We were very lucky that a
highly capable, democratic leader came to power in South Korea
when he did.
The countries that went under in the financial crisis all have one
thing in common: very weak banking systems. As Schumpeter
pointed out, the only institution that is really essential to a
capitalist economy is a bank: banks act as shock absorbers and
workout specialists during recessions. But in Asia’s command economy
the government simply told bankers what to do. In a meeting of
bankers in South Korea in April, 1998, it rapidly
became clear that none of the bankers in the room had any idea what
a ``workout loan’’ was: they had never made a credit judgment and
had no idea how to work with a troubled customer.
Banking is a very difficult business to learn. The best way
to learn it is to let foreign banks come into your country.
Argentina was perhaps the first country to do this.
Argentine banking fami-
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lies now send their children to foreign banks so that they can learn
the latest banking methodologies before they return to the local
bank. The other thing that is crucial is the rule of law:
you need to be able to collect on your loans. In the United
States you can take ownership of collateral property in three
months; in Mexico it can take a minimum of
three-and-half years - and in that time your investment has probably
deteriorated hopelessly.
DISCUSSION
An early theme to the discussion was the fate of globalization as an
ideology. A Swiss participant pointed out that the Uruguay
Round had ended up in a very different - and very much more
pro-market - climate than it had begun; now, he warned, the climate
seemed to be changing again, with right-wing governments losing
power around the world. He wondered what could be done to co-opt
emerging countries into the system. A panellist replied that the
reason why countries find the transition to the market economy
difficult is not usually ideological - anti-market ideology is dying
out in much of the world, and has almost completely disappeared in
Latin America - but lack of competence, particularly in putting
together a financial and legal system that works.
For one Swedish participant, confidence was the key. In most
countries, there is plenty of private capital available. But no one
will invest their capital unless they have confidence in the
institutional framework of the countries in which they are
investing. Indeed, lack of confidence promotes capital flight: there
is thirty times more Russian capital outside the country than inside
the country.
Several other participants emphasized the importance of fighting
corruption. An Italian pointed out that Europeans are often too
shy about fighting corruption in their own backyards: in
some European countries bribes are tax deductible. A Canadian
thought it a little odd to make the International Financial
Institutions the main vehicle for fighting corruption and
imposing the rights of labour, when non-governmental organizations
already have an
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impressive track record in fighting for these causes.
The problem of Russia aroused a good deal of comment. A French
participant argued that the West bore a good deal of
responsibility for Russia’s situation. It had encouraged Russia to
jump into a free-market system that it had taken forty years for
Western Europe to embrace. Perhaps we should recognize that we do
not need a perfect world in order to do business, he argued. But
most participants were less sympathetic. A Swede pointed out that
much of the money sent to Russia has been squandered.
The state of the coal industry, for instance, is not primarily a
social problem, he argued, but a problem of organized crime.
An American asked whether there would ever come a point at which the
West would decide to stop lending money to Russia. Yes,
replied one of the panellists, the West has said enough is enough in
August 1998; but the West has a continuing
interest in tying Russia into the international financial system.
However, the main focus of the discussion was the degree to which
outsiders - particularly the international financial institutions -
could intervene in the non-financial affairs of borrowers. A Finnish
banker pointed out that it has been standard practice in the
academic community for years to take into account social and
political factors. A Portuguese participant emphasized the
importance of having a "social argument’’ with all the major
partners in economic life.
But others were more skeptical. A Swedish banker pointed out that
for his profession, the state of the legal system was simply part of
credit risk. An American argued that it could be a huge mistake to
interfere in political issues: the IMF should meddle
only in areas where it has the expertise, such as banking. In
South Korea, for instance, the struggle between the
chaebol and the politicians has been a long-standing
political issue, and the IMF interfered at its peril.
A Canadian saw even more limitations in taking a "holistic’’
approach. Should the private sector really be involved with labour
organizations and religious organizations? And should businesspeople
try to double up as social missionar-
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ies? He worried that this policy would make the West enormously
vulnerable to demagogues. It might even create a "matrix of
colonialism’’.
In their conclusions, some of the panellists defended the idea that
the West had the right to demand higher standards. The
first panellist pointed out that in places like Azerbaijan,
Armenia and Georgia the discussion has
not been about the West imposing something: it had been asked to
provide help and give the benefit of its experience. Fighting
corruption had got huge domestic support in these countries: in
Georgia, for example, the government had put the exams
for judgeships on television to prove that the system was being
cleaned up. The battle against corruption is not an overnight thing.
And it needs to be built around the traditions of the countries
concerned. But, in his view, it was certainly not a matter of
imposing foreign values.
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