1. The Economic and Social Consequences
of Disarmament: U.S. Reply to the Inquiry of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, June 1964), pp. 8-9.
2. Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable (New York: Horizon,
1962), p. 35.
3. Robert S. McNamara, in an address before the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, Montreal, P.Q., Canada, 18 May 1966.
4. Alfred North Whitehead, in "The Anatomy of Some Scientific
Ideas," included in The Aims of Education (New York: Macmillan,
1929).
5. At Ann Arbor, Michigan, 16 June 1962.
6. Louis J. Halle, "Peace in Our Time? Nuclear Weapons as a
Stabilizer," The New Republic (28 December 1963).
7. Kenneth E. Boulding, "The World War Industry as an Economic
Problem," in Emile Benoit and Kenneth E. Boulding (eds.),
Disarmament and the Economy New York: Harper and Row, 1963).
8. McNamara, in ASNE Montreal address cited.
9. Report of the Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and
Disarmament (Washington: USGPO, July 1965).
10. Sumner M. Rosen, "Disarmament and the Economy," War/Peace Report
(March 1966).
11. Vide William D. Grampp, "False Fears of Disarmament," Harvard
Business Review (Jan.-Feb. 1964) for a concise example of this
reasoning.
12. Seymour Melman, "The Cost of Inspection for Disarmament," in
Benoit and Boulding, op. cit.
13. Arthur I. Waskow, Toward the Unarmed Forces of the United States
(Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1966), p. 9. (This is the
unabridged edition of the text of a report and proposal prepared for
a seminar of strategists and Congressmen in 1965; it was later given
limited distribution among other persons engaged in related
projects.)
14. David T. Bazelon, "The Politics of the Paper Economy,"
Commentary (November 1962), p. 409.
15. The Economic Impact of Disarmament (Washington: USGPO, January
1962).
16. David T. Bazelon, "The Scarcity Makers," Commentary (October
1962), p. 298.
17. Frank Pace, Jr., in an address before the American Bankers’
Association, September 1957.
18. A random example, taken in this case from a story by David Deitch in the New York Herald Tribune (9 February 1966).
19. Vide L. Gumplowicz, in Geschichte der Staatstheorien (Innsbruck:
Wagner, 1905) and earlier writings.
20. K. Fischer, Das Militaer (Zurich: Steinmetz Verlag, 1932), pp.
42-43.
21. The obverse of this phenomenon is responsible for the principal
combat problem of present-day infantry officers: the unwillingness
of otherwise "trained" troops to fire at an enemy close enough to be
recognizable as an individual rather than simply as a target.
22. Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1960), p. 42.
23. John D. Williams, "The Nonsense about Safe Driving," Fortune
(September 1958).
24. Vide most recently K. Lorenz, in Das Sogenannte Boese: zur
Naturgeschichte der Aggression (Vienna: G. Borotha-Schoeler Verlag,
1964).
25. Beginning with Herbert Spencer and his contemporaries, but
largely ignored for nearly a century.
26. As in recent draft-law controversy, in which the issue of
selective deferment of the culturally privileged is often carelessly
equated with the preservation of the biologically "fittest."
27. G. Bouthoul, in La Guerre (Paris: Presses universitaires de
France, 1953) and many other more detailed studies. The useful
concept of "polemology," for the study of war as an independent
discipline, is his, as is the notion of "demographic relaxation,"
the sudden temporary decline in the rate of population increase
after major wars.
28. This seemingly premature statement is supported by one of our
own test studies. But it hypothecates both the stabilizing of world
population growth and the institution of fully adequate
environmental controls. Under these two conditions, the probability
of the permanent elimination of involuntary global famine is 68
percent by 1976 and 95 percent by 1981.
29. This round figure is the median taken from our computations,
which cover varying contingencies, but it is sufficient for the
purpose of general discussion.
30. But less misleading than the more elegant traditional metaphor,
in which war expenditures are referred to as the "ballast" of the
economy but which suggests incorrect quantitative relationships.
31. Typical in generality, scope, and rhetoric. We have not used any
published program as a model; similarities are unavoidably
coincidental rather than tendentious.
32. Vide the reception of a "Freedom Budget for all Americans,"
proposed by A. Philip Randolph et al; it is a ten-year plan,
estimated by its sponsors to cost $185 billion.
33. Waskow, op. cit.
34. By several current theorists, most extensively and effectively
by Robert R. Harris in The Real Enemy, an unpublished doctoral
dissertation made available to this study.
35. In ASNE Montreal address cited.
36. The Tenth Victim.
37. For an examination of some of its social implications, see
Seymour Rubenfeld, Family of Outcasts: A New Theory of Delinquency
(New York: Free Press, 1965).
38. As in Nazi Germany; this type of "ideological" ethnic
repression, directed to specific sociological ends, should not be
confused with traditional economic exploitation, as of Negroes in
the U.S., South Africa, etc.
39. By teams of experimental biologists in Massachusetts, Michigan,
and California, as well as in Mexico and the U.S.S.R. Preliminary
test applications are scheduled in Southeast Asia, in countries not
yet announced.
40. Expressed in the writings of H. Marshall McLuhan, in
Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1964) and elsewhere.
41. This rather optimistic estimate was derived by plotting a
three-dimensional distribution of three arbitrarily defined
variables; the macro-structural, relating to the extension of
knowledge beyond the capacity of conscious experience; the organic,
dealing with the manifestations of terrestrial life as inherently
comprehensible; and the infra-particular, covering the subconceptual
requirements of natural phenomena. Values were assigned to the known
and unknown in each parameter, tested against data from earlier
chronologies, and modified heuristically until predictable
correlations reached a useful level of accuracy. "Two decades"
means, in this case, 20.6 years, with a standard deviation of only
1.8 years. (An incidental finding, not pursued to the same degree of
accuracy, suggests a greatly accelerated resolution of issues in the
biological sciences after 1972.)
42. Since they represent an examination of too small a percentage of
the eventual options, in terms of "multiple mating," the subsystem
we developed for this application. But an example will indicate how
one of the most frequently recurring correlation problems -
chronological phasing - was brought to light in this way. One of the
first combinations tested showed remarkably high coefficients of
compatibility, on a post hoc static basis, but no variations of
timing, using a thirty-year transition module, permitted even
marginal synchronization. The combination was thus disqualified.
This would not rule out the possible adequacy of combinations using
modifications of the same factors, however, since minor variations
in a proposed final condition may have disproportionate effects on
phasing.
43. Edward Teller, quoted in War/Peace Report (December 1964).
44. E.g., the highly publicized "Delphi technique" and other, more
sophisticated procedures. A new system, especially suitable for
institutional analysis, was developed during the course of this
study in order to hypothecate mensurable "peace games"; a manual of
this system is being prepared and will be submitted for general
distribution among appropriate agencies. For older, but still
useful, techniques, see Norman C. Dalkey’s Games and Simulations
(Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1964).
45. A primer-level example of the obvious and long overdue need for
such translation is furnished by Kahn (in Thinking About the
Unthinkable, p. 102). Under the heading "Some Awkward Choices" he
compares four hypothetical policies: a certain loss of $3,000; a .1
chance of loss of $300,000; a .01 chance of loss of $30,000,000; and
a .001 chance of loss of $3,000,000,000. A government decision-maker
would "very likely" choose in that order. But what if "lives are at
stake rather than dollars"? Kahn suggests that the order of choice
would be reversed, although current experience does not support this
opinion. Rational war research can and must make it possible to
express, without ambiguity, lives in terms of dollars and vice
versa; the choices need not be, and cannot be, "awkward."
46. Again, an overdue extension of an obvious application of
techniques up to now limited to such circumscribed purposes as
improving kill-ammunition ratios determining local choice between
precision and saturation bombing, and other minor tactical, and
occasionally strategic, ends. The slowness of Rand,
I.D.A., and
other responsible analytic organizations to extend
cost-effectiveness and related concepts beyond early-phase
applications has already been widely remarked on and criticized
elsewhere.
47. The inclusion of institutional factors in war-game techniques
has been given some rudimentary consideration in the Hudson
Institute’s Study for Hypothetical Narratives for Use in Command and
Control Systems Planning (by William Pfaff and Edmund Stillman;
Final report published 1963). But here, as with other war and peace
studies to date, what has blocked the logical extension of new
analytic techniques has been a general failure to understand and
properly evaluate the nonmilitary functions of war.